This document specifies a means to find authoritative RADIUS servers for a given realm. It is used in conjunction with either RADIUS/TLS and RADIUS/DTLS.
Introduction RADIUS in all its current transport variants (RADIUS/UDP, RADIUS/TCP, RADIUS/TLS, RADIUS/DTLS) requires manual configuration of all peers (clients, servers).
Where more than one administrative entity collaborates for RADIUS authentication of their respective customers (a "roaming consortium"), the Network Access Identifier (NAI) [I-D.ietf-radext-nai] is the suggested way of differentiating users between those entities; the part of a username to the right of the @ delimiter in an NAI is called the user's "realm". Where many realms and RADIUS forwarding servers are in use, the number of realms to be forwarded and the corresponding number of servers to configure may be significant. Where new realms with new servers are added or details of existing servers change on a regular basis, maintaining a single monolithic configuration file for all these details may prove too cumbersome to be useful.
Furthermore, in cases where a roaming consortium consists of independently working branches (e.g. departments, national subsidiaries), each with their own forwarding servers, and who add or change their realm lists at their own discretion, there is additional complexity in synchronising the changed data across all branches.
Where realms can be partitioned (e.g. according to their top-level domain ending), forwarding of requests can be realised with a hierarchy of RADIUS servers, all serving their partition of the realm space. Figure 1 show an example of this hierarchical routing. This document also specifies various approaches for verifying that server information which was retrieved from DNS was from an authorised party; e.g. an organisation which is not at all part of a given roaming consortium may alter its own DNS records to yield a result for its own realm.
Requirements Language
In this document, several words are used to signify the requirements of the specification. The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119. 
Document Status
This document is an Experimental RFC.
The communities expected to use this document are roaming consortia whose authentication services are based on the RADIUS protocol.
The duration of the experiment is undetermined; as soon as enough experience is collected on the choice points mentioned below, it is expected to be obsoleted by a standards-track version of the protocol which trims down the choice points.
If that removal of choice points obsoletes tags or service names as defined in this document and allocated by IANA, these items will be returned to IANA as per the provisions in [RFC6335] .
The document provides a discovery mechanism for RADIUS which is very similar to the approach that is taken with the Diameter protocol [RFC6733] . As such, the basic approach (using Naming Authority Pointer (NAPTR) records in DNS domains which match NAI realms) is not of very experimental nature.
However, the document offers a few choice points and extensions which go beyond the provisions for Diameter. The S-NAPTR service and protocols are unrelated to the IANA Service Name and Transport Protocol Number registry.
The delimiter '.' in the protocol tags is only a separator for human reading convenience -not for structure or namespacing; it MUST NOT be parsed in any way by the querying application or resolver.
The use of the separator '.' is common also in other protocols' protocol tags. This is coincidence and does not imply a shared semantics with such protocols.
Definition of Conditions for Retry/Failure
RADIUS is a time-critical protocol; RADIUS clients which do not receive an answer after a configurable, but short, amount of time, will consider the request failed. Due to this, there is little leeway for extensive retries.
As a general rule, only error conditions which generate an immediate response from the other end are eligible for a retry of a discovered target. Any error condition involving timeouts, or the absence of a reply for more than one second during the connection setup phase is to be considered a failure; the next target in the set of discovered NAPTR targets is to be tried.
Note that [RFC3958] already defines that a failure to identify the server as being authoritative for the realm is always considered a failure; so even if a discovered target returns a wrong credential instantly, it is not eligible for retry.
Furthermore, the contacted RADIUS/TLS server verifies during connection setup whether or not it finds the connecting RADIUS/TLS client authorized or not. If the connecting RADIUS/TLS client is not found acceptable, the server will close the TLS connection immediately with an appropriate alert. Such TLS handshake failures are permanently fatal and not eligible for retry, unless the connecting client has more X.509 certificates to try; in this case, a retry with the remainder of its set of certificates SHOULD be attempted. Not trying all available client certificates potentially creates a DoS for the end-user whose authentication attempt triggered the discovery; one of the neglected certificates might have led to a successful RADIUS connection and subsequent end-user authentication.
If the TLS session setup to a discovered target does not succeed, that target (as identified by IP address and port number) SHOULD be ignored from the result set of any subsequent executions of the discovery algorithm at least until the target's Effective TTL (see After the algorithm in this document has been executed, a RADIUS/TLS session as per [RFC6614] is established. Since the dynamic discovery algorithm does not have provisions to establish confidential keying material between the RADIUS/TLS client (i.e. the server which executes the discovery algorithm) and the RADIUS/TLS server which was discovered, TLS-PSK ciphersuites cannot be used in the subsequent TLS handshake. Only TLS ciphersuites using X.509 certificates can be used with this algorithm.
There are numerous ways to define which certificates are acceptable for use in this context. This document defines one mandatory-toimplement mechanism which allows to verify whether the contacted host is authoritative for an NAI realm or not. It also gives one example of another mechanism which is currently in wide-spread deployment, and one possible approach based on DNSSEC which is yet unimplemented.
For the approaches which use trust roots (see the following two sections), a typical deployment will use a dedicated trust store for RADIUS/TLS certificate authorities, particularly a trust store which is independent from default "browser" trust stores. Often, this will be one or few CAs, and they only issue certificates for the specific purpose of establishing RADIUS server-to-server trust. It is important not to trust a large set of CAs which operate outside the control of the roaming consortium, for their issuance of certificates with the properties important for authorisation (such as NAIRealm and policyOID below) is difficult to verify. Therefore, clients SHOULD NOT be pre-configured with a list of known public CAs by the vendor or manufacturer. Instead, the clients SHOULD start off with an empty CA list. The addition of a CA SHOULD be done only when manually configured by an administrator.
2.1.1.3.1. Mandatory-to-implement mechanism: Trust Roots + NAIRealm
Verification of authority to provide AAA services over RADIUS/TLS is a two-step process.
Step 1 is the verification of certificate wellformedness and validity as per [RFC5280] and whether it was issued from a root certificate which is deemed trustworthy by the RADIUS/TLS client.
Step 2 is to compare the value of algorithm's variable "R" after the execution of step 3 of the discovery algorithm in Section 3. Verification of authority to provide AAA services over RADIUS/TLS is a two-step process.
Step 2 is to compare the values of the contacted RADIUS/TLS server's X.509 certificate's extensions of type "Policy OID" to a list of configured acceptable Policy OIDs for the roaming consortium. If one of the configured OIDs is found in the certificate's Policy OID extensions, then the server is considered authorized; if there is no match, the server is considered unauthorized.
This mechanism is inferior to the mandatory-to-implement mechanism in the previous section because all authorized servers are validated by the same OID value; the mechanism is not fine-grained enough to express authority for one specific realm inside the consortium. If the consortium contains members which are hostile against other members, this weakness can be exploited by one RADIUS/TLS server impersonating another if DNS responses can be spoofed by the hostile member.
The shortcomings in server identification can be partially mitigated by using the RADIUS infrastructure only with authentication payloads which provide mutual authentication and credential protection (i.e. EAP types passing the criteria of [RFC4017]): using mutual authentication prevents the hostile server from mimicking the real EAP server (it can't terminate the EAP authentication unnoticed because it does not have the server certificate from the real EAP server); protection of credentials prevents the impersonating server from learning usernames and passwords of the ongoing EAP conversation (other RADIUS attributes pertaining to the authentication, such as the EAP peer's Calling-Station-ID, can still be learned though).
Other mechanism: DNSSEC / DANE
Where DNSSEC is used, the results of the algorithm can be trusted; i.e. the entity which executes the algorithm can be certain that the realm that triggered the discovery is actually served by the server that was discovered via DNS. However, this does not guarantee that the server is also authorized (i.e. a recognised member of the roaming consortium). The server still needs to present an X.509 certificate proving its authority to serve a particular realm.
The authorization can be sketched using DNSSEC+DANE as follows: DANE/ TLSA records of all authorized servers are put into a DNSSEC zone which contains all known and authorised realms; the zone is rooted in a common, consortium-agreed branch of the DNS tree. The entity executing the algorithm uses the realm information from the authentication attempt, and then attempts to retrieve TLSA Resource Records (TLSA RR) for the DNS label "realm.commonroot". It then verifies that the presented server certificate during the RADIUS/TLS handshake matches the information in the TLSA record. Note that RADIUS/TLS connections always mutually authenticate the RADIUS server and the RADIUS client. This specification provides an algorithm for a RADIUS client to contact and verify authorization of a RADIUS server only. During connection setup, the RADIUS server also needs to verify whether it considers the connecting RADIUS client authorized; this is outside the scope of this specification.
SRV
This specification defines two SRV prefixes (i.e. two values for the "_service. Just like NAPTR records, the lookup and subsequent follow-up of SRV records may yield more than one server to contact in a prioritised list. [RFC2782] does not specify rules regarding "Definition of Conditions for Retry/Failure", nor "Server Identification and Handshake". This specification defines that the rules for these two topics as defined in Section 2.1.1.2 and Section 2.1.1.3 SHALL be used both for targets retrieved via an initial NAPTR RR as well as for targets retrieved via an initial SRV RR (i.e. in the absence of NAPTR RRs).
Optional name mangling
It is expected that in most cases, the SRV and/or NAPTR label used for the records is the DNS A-label representation of the literal realm name for which the server is the authoritative RADIUS server (i.e. the realm name after conversion according to section 5 of [RFC5891] ).
However, arbitrary other labels or service tags may be used if, for example, a roaming consortium uses realm names which are not associated to DNS names or special-purpose consortia where a globally valid discovery is not a use case. Such other labels require a consortium-wide agreement about the transformation from realm name to lookup label, and/or which service tag to use. This specification retrieves IP addresses and port numbers from the Domain Name System which are subsequently used to authenticate users via the RADIUS/TLS protocol. Regardless whether the results from DNS discovery are trustworthy or not (e.g. DNSSEC in use), it is always important to verify that the server which was contacted is authorized to service requests for the user which triggered the discovery process.
The input to the algorithm is an NAI realm as specified in Section 3.4.1. As a consequence, the X.509 certificate of the server which is ultimately contacted for user authentication needs to be able to express that it is authorized to handle requests for that realm.
Current subjectAltName fields do not semantically allow to express an NAI realm; the field subjectAltName:dNSName is syntactically a good match but would inappropriately conflate DNS names and NAI realm names. Thus, this specification defines a new subjectAltName field to hold either a single NAI realm name or a wildcard name matching a set of NAI realms.
The subjectAltName:otherName:sRVName field certifies that a certificate holder is authorized to provide a service; this can be compared to the target of DNS label's SRV resource record. If the Domain Name System is insecure, it is required that the label of the SRV record itself is known-correct. In this specification, that label is not known-correct; it is potentially derived from a (potentially untrusted) NAPTR resource record of another label. If DNS is not secured with DNSSEC, the NAPTR resource record may have been altered by an attacker with access to the Domain Name System resolution, and thus the label to lookup the SRV record for may already be tainted. This makes subjectAltName:otherName:sRVName not a trusted comparison item.
Further to this, this specification's NAPTR entries may be of type "A" which do not involve resolution of any SRV records, which again makes subjectAltName:otherName:sRVName unsuited for this purpose.
This section defines the NAIRealm name as a form of otherName from the GeneralName structure in SubjectAltName defined in [RFC5280] . The algorithm contains various variables for timeouts. These variables are named here and reasonable default values are provided. Implementations wishing to deviate from these defaults should make they understand the implications of changes.
DNS_TIMEOUT: maximum amount of time to wait for the complete set of all DNS queries to complete: Default = 3 seconds MIN_EFF_TTL: minimum DNS TTL of discovered targets: Default = 60 seconds BACKOFF_TIME: if no conclusive DNS response was retrieved after DNS_TIMEOUT, do not attempt dynamic discovery before BACKOFF_TIME has elapsed. Default = 600 seconds
Terms
Positive DNS response: a response which contains the RR that was queried for.
Negative DNS response: a response which does not contain the RR that was queried for, but contains an SOA record along with a TTL indicating cache duration for this negative result.
DNS Error: Where the algorithm states "name resolution returns with an error", this shall mean that either the DNS request timed out, or a DNS response which is neither a positive nor a negative response (e.g. SERVFAIL).
Effective TTL: The validity period for discovered RADIUS/TLS target hosts. Calculated as: Effective TTL (set of DNS TTL values) = max { MIN_EFF_TTL, min { DNS TTL values } } SRV lookup: for the purpose of this specification, SRV lookup procedures are defined as per [RFC2782] , but excluding that RFCs "A" fallback as defined in its section "Usage Rules", final "else" clause.
Greedy result evaluation: The NAPTR to SRV/A/AAAA resolution may lead to a tree of results, whose leafs are the IP addresses to contact. The branches of the tree are ordered according to their order/ preference DNS properties. An implementation is executing greedy result evaluation if it uses a depth-first search in the tree along the highest order results, attempts to connect to the corresponding resulting IP addresses, and only backtracks to other branches if the higher ordered results did not end in successful connection attempts. For RADIUS Authentication and RADIUS Accounting server discovery, input I to the algorithm is the RADIUS User-Name attribute with content of the form "user@realm"; the literal @ sign being the separator between a local user identifier within a realm and its realm. The use of multiple literal @ signs in a User-Name is strongly discouraged; but if present, the last @ sign is to be considered the separator. All previous instances of the @ sign are to be considered part of the local user identifier.
For RADIUS DynAuth Server discovery, input I to the algorithm is the domain name of the operator of a RADIUS realm as was communicated during user authentication using the Operator-Name attribute ([RFC5580], section 4.1). Only Operator-Name values with the namespace "1" are supported by this algorithm -the input to the algorithm is the actual domain name, preceeded with an "@" (but without the "1" namespace identifier byte of that attribute).
Note well: The attribute User-Name is defined to contain UTF-8 text.
In practice, the content may or may not be UTF-8. Even if UTF-8, it may or may not map to a domain name in the realm part. Implementors MUST take possible conversion error paths into consideration when parsing incoming User-Name attributes. This document describes server discovery only for well-formed realms mapping to DNS domain names in UTF-8 encoding. The result of all other possible contents of User-Name is unspecified; this includes, but is not limited to:
Usage of separators other than @.
Encoding of User-Name in local encodings.
UTF-8 realms which fail the conversion rules as per [RFC5891].
UTF-8 realms which end with a . ("dot") character.
For the last bullet point, "trailing dot", special precautions should be taken to avoid problems when resolving servers with the algorithm below: they may resolve to a RADIUS server even if the peer RADIUS server only is configured to handle the realm without the trailing dot. If that RADIUS server again uses NAI discovery to determine the authoritative server, the server will forward the request to localhost, resulting in a tight endless loop. Output O of the algorithm is a two-tuple consisting of: O-1) a set of tuples {hostname; port; protocol; order/preference; Effective TTL} -the set can be empty; and O-2) an integer: if the set in the first part of the tuple is empty, the integer contains the Effective TTL for backoff timeout, if the set is not empty, the integer is set to 0 (and not used).
Algorithm
The algorithm to determine the RADIUS server to contact is as follows:
1. Determine P = (position of last "@" character) in I. 
6.
Using the host's name resolution library, perform a NAPTR query for R (see "Delay considerations" below). If the result is a negative DNS response, O-2 = Effective TTL ( TTL value of the SOA record ) and continue at step 13. If name resolution returns with error, O-1 = { empty set }, O-2 = BACKOFF_TIME and terminate.
7.
Extract NAPTR records with service tag "aaa+auth", "aaa+acct", "aaa+dynauth" as appropriate. Keep note of the protocol tag and remaining TTL of each of the discovered NAPTR records.
8.
If no records found, continue at step 13.
9.
For the extracted NAPTRs, perform successive resolution as defined in [RFC3958] , section 2.2. An implementation MAY use greedy result evaluation according to the NAPTR order/preference fields (i.e. can execute the subsequent steps of this algorithm for the highest-order entry in the set of results, and only lookup the remainder of the set if necessary).
10. If the set of hostnames is empty, O-1 = { empty set }, O-2 = BACKOFF_TIME and terminate. 20. O-1 = { empty set }, O-2 = BACKOFF_TIME, log error, Terminate.
Validity of results
The dynamic discovery algorithm is used by servers which do not have sufficient configuration information to process an incoming request on their own. If the discovery algorithm result contains the server's own listening address (IP address and port), then there is a potential for an endless forwarding loop. If the listening address is the DNS result with the highest priorty, the server will enter a tight loop (the server would forward the request to itself, triggering dynamic discovery again in a perpetual loop forward to another host with a higher priority, which might use DNS itself and forward the packet back to the first server). The underlying reason that enables these loops is that the server executing the discovery algorithm is seriously misconfigured in that it does not recognise the request as one that is to be processed by itself. RADIUS has no built-in loop detection, so any such loops would remain undetected. So, if step 18 of the algorithm discovers such a possible-loop situation, the algorithm should be aborted and an error logged. Note that this safeguard does not provide perfect protection against routing loops. One reason which might introduce a loop include the possiblity that a subsequent hop has a statically configured next-hop which leads to an earlier host in the loop. Another reason for occuring loops is if the algorithm was executed with greedy result evaluation, and the own address was in a lowerpriority branch of the result set which was not retrieved from DNS at all, and thus can't be detected.
After executing the above algorithm, the RADIUS server establishes a connection to a home server from the result set. This connection can potentially remain open for an indefinite amount of time. This conflicts with the possibility of changing device and network configurations on the receiving end. Typically, TTL values for records in the name resolution system are used to indicate how long it is safe to rely on the results of the name resolution. If these TTLs are very low, thrashing of connections becomes possible; the Effective TTL mitigates that risk. When a connection is open and the smallest of the Effective TTL value which was learned during discovering the server has not expired, subsequent new user sessions for the realm which corresponds to that open connection SHOULD re-use the existing connection and SHOULD NOT re-execute the dynamic discovery algorithm nor open a new connection. To allow for a change of configuration, a RADIUS server SHOULD re-execute the dynamic discovery algorithm after the Effective TTL that is associated with this connection has expired. The server SHOULD keep the session open during this re-assessment to avoid closure and immediate re-opening of the connection should the result not have changed.
Should the algorithm above terminate with O-1 = empty set, the RADIUS server SHOULD NOT attempt another execution of this algorithm for the same target realm before the timeout O-2 has passed.
Delay considerations
The host's name resolution library may need to contact outside entities to perform the name resolution (e.g. authoritative name servers for a domain), and since the NAI discovery algorithm is based on uncontrollable user input, the destination of the lookups is out of control of the server that performs NAI discovery. If such (TTL = 47) 50 50 "s" "aaa+auth:radius.tls.tcp" "" _myradius._tcp.xn--tu-mnchen-t9a.example.
(TTL = 522) 50 50 "s" "fooservice:bar.dccp" "" _abc123._def.xn--tu-mnchen-t9a.example.
7.
Result:
(TTL = 47) 50 50 "s" "aaa+auth:radius.tls.tcp" "" _myradius._tcp.xn--tu-mnchen-t9a.example. 
Operations and Manageability Considerations
The discovery algorithm as defined in this document contains several options; the major ones being use of NAPTR vs. SRV; how to determine the authorization status of a contacted server for a given realm; which trust anchors to consider trustworthy for the RADIUS conversation setup.
Random parties which do not agree on the same set of options may not be able to interoperate. However, such a global interoperability is not intended by this document. A roaming consortium's roaming agreement must include a profile of which choice points of this document to use. So long as the roaming consortium can settle on one deployment profile, they will be able to interoperate based on that choice; this per-consortium interoperability is the intended scope of this document.
Security Considerations
When using DNS without DNSSEC security extensions and validation for all of the replies to NAPTR, SRV and A/AAAA requests as described in section Section 3, the result of the discovery process can not be trusted. Even if it can be trusted (i.e. DNSSEC is in use), actual authorization of the discovered server to provide service for the given realm needs to be verified. A mechanism from section Section 2.1.1.3 or equivalent MUST be used to verify authorization.
The algorithm has a configurable completion timeout DNS_TIMEOUT defaulting to three seconds for RADIUS' operational reasons. The lookup of DNS resource records based on unverified user input is an attack vector for DoS attacks: an attacker might intentionally craft bogus DNS zones which take a very long time to reply (e.g. due to a particularly byzantine tree structure, or artificial delays in responses).
To mitigate this DoS vector, implementations SHOULD consider ratelimiting either their amount of new executions of the dynamic discovery algorithm as a whole, or the amount of intermediate responses to track, or at least the number of pending DNS queries. Implementations MAY choose lower values than the default for DNS_TIMEOUT to limit the impact of DoS attacks via that vector. They MAY also continue their attempt to resolve DNS records even after DNS_TIMEOUT has passed; a subsequent request for the same realm might benefit from retrieving the results anyway. The amount of time to spent waiting for a result will influence the impact of a possible DoS attack; the waiting time value is implementation dependent and outside the scope of this specification.
With Dynamic Discovery being enabled for a RADIUS Server, and depending on the deployment scenario, the server may need to open up its target IP address and port for the entire internet, because arbitrary clients may discover it as a target for their o RADIUS clients which make use of dynamic discovery will need to query the Domain Name System, and use a user's realm name as the query label. A passive observer on the IP path between the RADIUS client and the DNS server(s) being queried can learn that a user of that specific realm was trying to authenticate at that RADIUS client at a certain point in time. This may or may not be sufficient for the passive observer to create a mobility profile. During the recursive DNS resolution, a fair number of DNS servers and the IP hops in between those get to learn that information. Not every single authentication triggers DNS lookups, so there is no one-to-one relation of leaked realm information and the number of authentications for that realm.
o Since dynamic discovery operates on a RADIUS hop-by-hop basis, there is no guarantee that the RADIUS payload is not transmitted between RADIUS systems which do not make use of this algorithm, and possibly using other transports such as RADIUS/UDP. On such hops, the enhanced privacy is jeopardized. Description: Authentication, Accounting and Dynamic authorization via the RADIUS protocol. These service names are used to construct the SRV service labels "_radiustls" and "_radiusdtls" for discovery of RADIUS/TLS and RADIUS/DTLS servers, respectively.
Reference: RFC Editor Note: please insert the RFC number of this document. The protocol does not use broadcast, multicast or anycast communication.
This specification makes use of the SRV Protocol identifiers "_tcp" and "_udp" which are mentioned as early as [RFC2782] but do not appear to be assigned in an actual registry. Since they are in widespread use in other protocols, this specification refrains from requesting a new registry "RADIUS/TLS SRV Protocol Registry" and continues to make use of these tags implicitly.
This document requires that a number of Object Identifiers be assigned. They are now under the control of IANA following [RFC7299] IANA is requested to assign the following identifiers:
TBD99 is to be assigned from the "SMI Security for PKIX Module Identifier Registry". The suggested description is id-mod-nairealm-08. 
